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INTRODUCTION 
When faced with an unreasonable noncompetition agreement, a 
court faces a choice. In some states, a court may simply refuse to enforce 
such an agreement. In other states, however, a court may use a legal doctrine 
called the blue pencil doctrine.1 Under the blue pencil doctrine, courts are 
permitted to cross out overbroad provisions that make a noncompetition 
agreement unenforceable. The blue pencil doctrine gives courts the authority 
to either (1) strike unreasonable clauses from a noncompetition agreement, 
leaving the rest to be enforced or (2) modify the agreement to reflect the 
terms that the parties could have—and probably should have—agreed to.2 
In recent years, a number of courts have criticized the continued use 
of the blue pencil doctrine, noting that it incentivizes employer overreach.3 
In 2015 and 2016, two state Supreme Courts explicitly rejected the use of the 
doctrine.4 These and other courts have noted the potential for harm to 
employees, employers, and the judicial system as a whole. Despite this 
critique, however, the doctrine survives, buoyed by courts eager to rescue 
employers from their overzealous drafting.  
Even worse, some state legislatures mandate the use of the blue 
pencil doctrine. In these states, legislatures have proved willing to encroach 
on judicial independence and discretion. These legislatures require courts to 
modify unreasonable agreements so as to make them reasonable.  
As I will discuss below, the blue pencil doctrine harms employees, 
employers, and ultimately, society as a whole. Use of the blue pencil doctrine 
upsets a balance in the system. Courts already use a test to determine 
enforceability and that balancing test is designed to recognize an employer’s 
interest in retention, while at the same time, encouraging employers to set 
reasonable restrictions. Reasonable restrictions prevent unfair competition 
while protecting employee mobility. Use of the blue pencil doctrine frees 
employers from the need to make difficult decisions, knowing they may rely 
on the court system to correct any contracting mistakes.  
In the first part of this article, I review the peculiar nature of the 
noncompetition agreement. The noncompetition agreement exists as a unique 
contractual agreement, one that is subject to requirements that go beyond that 
of an ordinary employment agreement. Next, I examine the blue pencil 
doctrine, a legal device that permits a court to disregard the express language 
of the agreement and modify the terms to make the agreement reasonable. 
The blue pencil doctrine permits a court to use its equitable powers to impose 
 
 1. Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1469 
(1st Cir. 1992) (citing Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods. Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompetition Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 107, 142–45 (2008); see infra Part III. 
 4. See Unlimited Opportunity, Inc. v. Waddah, 861 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Neb. 2015); 
Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 153 (Nev. 2016). 
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terms that neither employee nor employer agreed to. In the final section of 
the paper I review the many reasons that some courts have rejected the use 
of the blue pencil. I then conclude with the multiple reasons to restrict the 
use of the blue pencil doctrine. 
I.   AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT 
A. A Noncompetition Agreement Restricts Employee Mobility 
A noncompetition agreement represents “[a] promise, [usually] in a 
sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the 
same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, 
partner, or employer.”5 The noncompetition agreement has other names, 
most notably “covenant not to compete,” a “restrictive covenant,” or a 
“noncompetition clause.”6 Generally, these terms are interchangeable and all 
refer to an employment contract or provision purporting to limit an 
employee’s ability, upon leaving employment, to compete in the market in 
which the former employer does business.7 
In the employment context, noncompetition agreements are 
generally directed at four discrete areas: “(1) general noncompetition; 
(2) customer (or client) non-solicitation; (3) employee non-solicitation; and 
(4) nondisclosure.”8 Though the nomenclature differs, non-solicitation 
provisions, whether aimed at customer or employee solicitation, are forms of 
noncompetition agreements. The same legal standard of enforceability 
applies to each.9 Similarly, nondisclosure agreements also resemble 
noncompetition agreements, with the same restrictions on enforceability. 
Courts subject nondisclosure agreements to the same sort of balancing tests 
as noncompetition agreements.10 Sometimes, however, these four different 
 
 5. Covenant Not to Compete, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 6. This Article will collectively refer to such covenants as “noncompetition 
agreements.” 
 7. See Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906, 914 (W. Va. 1982) (discussing 
generally the nature of noncompetition agreements and how such agreements, through various 
incentives and restrictions imposed on the employee, “provide[] a mechanism consistent with 
the economic rational of contract law”). 
 8. Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete . . . ”: The 
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2002). 
 9. See Lasership, Inc. v. Watson, 79 Va. Cir. 205, 214 (2009) (citing Foti v. Cook, 263 
S.E.2d 430, 433 (Va. 1980)) (invalidating a non-solicitation agreement that prohibited a 
former employee from contacting any of the employer’s customers for two years because it 
was burdensome to expect the former employee to know every customer that had an account 
with the employer). 
 10. See id. at 215 (“The protection afforded to confidential information should reflect a 
balance between an employer who has invested time, money, and effort into developing such 
information and an employee’s general right to make use of knowledge and skills acquired 
through experience in a field or industry for which he is best suited.”). 
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areas are intermingled within the same document. Noncompetition 
agreements may, and often do, contain some or all of these protective clauses. 
In theory, noncompetition agreements do not punish the former 
employee.11 Instead, noncompetition agreements protect the employer from 
unfair competition.12 Noncompetition agreements arguably protect an 
employer’s customer base, trade secrets, and other information vital to its 
success.13 From this perspective, noncompetition agreements encourage 
employers to invest in their employees. An employer does not wish to invest 
in an employee only to see the employee take the skills acquired, or the 
employer’s customers, to a competitor. Logically, the employer will invest 
more in the employee if measures are in place to guard against the 
employee’s movement to a competitor. 
The noncompetition agreement discourages employee movement 
between employers. An enforceable noncompetition agreement will prevent 
an employee from working for a competitor within a specified length of time. 
Noncompetition agreements were once reserved for upper-level employees. 
In recent years, however, use of these agreements has expanded to other 
members of organizations.14 Noncompetition agreements do not eliminate 
employee turnover; however, they act as a strong deterrent to employees 
contemplated a job change. Understandably, few employees can readily 
endure a period of inactivity—a term that could last up to three years based 
on a typical noncompetition agreement.15 A noncompetition agreement, even 
if never enforced, provides a strong disincentive to leave a job. 
 
 11. See Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) 
(quoting Cont’l Research Corp. v. Scholz, 595 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)) 
(invalidating a ten-year noncompetition agreement, and stating that “‘[p]rotection of the 
employer, not punishment of the employee, is the essence of the law’”). 
 12. See Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623, 635 (Conn. 2006) 
(analyzing various provisions of a noncompetition agreement and giving particular scrutiny to 
a forfeiture for competition provision, whereby a former employee may be required to forfeit 
monetary benefits upon entering into competition with his or her former employer); William 
M. Corrigan, Jr. & Michael B. Kass, Non-Compete Agreements and Unfair Competition—An 
Updated Overview, 62 J. MO. B. 81, 81 (2006) (quoting Wash. Cty. Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Sidebottom, 7 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)) (“Non-compete agreements are 
enforceable only to the extent that they are ‘reasonably necessary to protect narrowly defined 
and well-recognized employer interests.’”). 
 13. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract 
Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1148 (2009) (noting that part of the efficiency of the 
noncompetition agreement rests on the fact that it avoids the issue of employees having trade 
secrets). 
 14. See Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of 
Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2012) 
(explaining how entry level employees are sometimes forced to sign noncompetition 
agreements). 
 15. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Burns, 457 F. Supp. 2d 806, 813 (W.D. Mich. 2006) 
(“Courts have upheld non-compete agreements covering time periods of six months to three 
years.”). 
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Moreover, an employee restrained by a noncompetition agreement 
will have a more difficult time finding a new place to work. Employers 
understand the difficulties in poaching employees who have executed a 
noncompetition agreement.16 An organization seeking to hire away key 
employees from a competitor will be aware that those employees may not be 
able to start work in the near term. An employee forced to the sidelines for a 
year or more is considerably less desirable to another employer. 
The noncompetition agreement inhibits competitors in another 
meaningful way. A competitor that hires an employee away from a company, 
knowing that the employee is under a contractual obligation to not work for 
the competitor, risks being sued for tortious interference with a contract.17 A 
company that persuades a potential hire to breach a noncompetition 
agreement may be liable under this theory.18 The original employer then may 
have a suit not only against its former employee for breach of the 
noncompetition agreement, but also against the hiring competitor for 
encouraging the former employee to breach her contractual obligations.19 
Without the presence of overwhelming factors in favor of hiring an individual 
subject to a noncompetition agreement, many organizations may simply 
refuse to run the risk of a lawsuit. 
B. The Enforcement of Noncompetition Agreements Varies 
The enforcement of noncompetition agreements differs between 
courts, between states, and between contexts. Courts determine the 
enforceability of noncompetition agreements with little regard for the normal 
 
 16. See Hannah Hembree, Comment, An Employer’s Relationship with Its Recruiting 
Firm—Something More Than an Arm’s-Length Transaction, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 245, 279–82 
(2015) (summarizing the effectiveness of noncompetition agreements in preventing 
employee-poaching). 
 17. In Lumley v. Wagner, a singer under contract to sing at the plaintiff’s theater was 
induced by the defendant, who operated a rival theater, to breach her contract. Lumley v. 
Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 688 (Ch.). The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover monetary damages from the rival theatre owner for his interference with the singer’s 
contract, which was essentially a form of unlawful competition. Id. at 687. This case is the 
basis for the tort of inducement to breach a contract. See id. 
 18. It is implied from the judicial record that, in order for a plaintiff-employer to 
successfully bring a cause of action for tortious interference against a former employee and 
her new employer, the noncompetition agreement at issue must necessarily be enforceable. 
See, e.g., Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs. Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 
340 (Va. 2005) (noting the plaintiff-employer’s claim for tortious interference against a former 
employee, but holding in favor of the employer because the noncompetition agreement was 
overbroad and unenforceable); Lasership, Inc. v. Watson, 79 Va. Cir. 205, 217 (2009) 
(recognizing the plaintiff’s cause of action for tortious interference, but dismissing the claim 
because the nonsolicitation agreement was not enforceable). 
 19. See Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 687 (allowing plaintiff, the former employer, to enforce 
injunction against a competitor where employee was induced by the competitor to breach her 
contract with the plaintiff). 
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requirements of an enforceable contract.20 A noncompetition agreement is a 
unique type of contract, as the normal contract standard of mutual agreement 
supported by consideration falls to the wayside. Instead, reasonableness 
becomes the key to enforceability.21Analysis of a noncompetition agreement 
tends not only to be fact-dependent, but location-dependent as well.22 Some 
states enforce virtually all noncompetition agreements; other states refuse to 
enforce any noncompetition agreements.23 Most other states inhabit a middle 
ground—enforcing noncompetition agreements, but only up to the limit that 
a court believes to be reasonable.24  
Analysis of the enforceability of a noncompetition agreement centers 
on the concept of reasonableness. Courts will only enforce reasonable 
noncompetition agreements. Reasonable noncompetition agreements are 
those constrained by geography, time, and scope.25 To determine 
reasonableness, courts will measure the relative degrees of harm to be 
suffered by the employer and the employee, and then make enforcement 
decisions accordingly.26 In measuring the potential harm and to examine the 
 
 20. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and 
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379 
(2006) (explaining that these types of agreements are governed neither by ordinary contract 
principles nor waivable rights). 
 21. See Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex. 2011) (“The hallmark of 
enforcement [of covenants not to compete] is whether or not the covenant is reasonable.”); 
Adam V. Buente, Note, Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements in the Buckeye State: 
How and Why Ohio Courts Apply the Reasonableness Standard to Entrepreneurs, 8 
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 73, 80–81 (2013) (“Not all noncompete agreements are created equally. 
Again, the reasonableness of a noncompete agreement is determined by the particular 
circumstances of the case. Most courts can modify or invalidate a noncompete agreement if it 
is found to be unreasonable.”) (citing Jon P. McClanahan & Kimberly M. Burke, Sharpening 
the Blunt Blue Pencil: Renewing the Reasons for Covenants Not to Compete in North 
Carolina, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (2012)). 
 22. See M. Scott McDonald, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding the Cost of 
Unpredictability, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 146 (2003) (outlining how noncompetition 
agreement law varies from state to state). 
 23. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 392–93 (noting California’s treatment of 
noncompetition agreements as being the most restrictive, holding them void as a restraint on 
trade). 
 24. See, e.g., Coates v. Bastian Bros., 741 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) 
(restating the principle under Michigan law that noncompetition agreements are enforceable 
if reasonable) (quoting Thermatool Corp. v. Borzym, 575 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998)). 
 25. See Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs. L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 655 (Tex. 2006) 
(recognizing that the core inquiry of section 15.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code 
“is whether the covenant ‘contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of 
activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is 
necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.’”) (quoting TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (West 2014)); McDonald, supra note 22, at 147 
(“[G]eography must be limited in a very specific way or the contract will not be enforced at 
all.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Thermatool Corp., 575 N.W.2d at 338 (discussing the relative-degree-of-
harms analysis in the context of enforcing an agreement not to compete). 
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interests of the parties, courts consider numerous items outside the terms of 
the agreement.27  
C. Enforcement Involves Weighing Policy Interests 
Agreements that act as a restraint on trade “are not favored, will be 
strictly construed, and, in the event of an ambiguity, will be construed in 
favor of the employee.”28 This general rule of noncompetition agreements 
presents difficulties to employers, employees, and the courts charged with 
enforcement.29 It is little wonder then that the law of noncompetition 
agreements is “a mess.”30 Moreover, the confusion and complexity of 
noncompetition agreement law has worsened over time.31 
Multiple policy reasons support the refusal to enforce 
noncompetition agreements. Employee mobility is important. Employee 
mobility has numerous benefits for employees: higher wages, increased 
opportunities, better retirement and medical plans, and increased 
satisfaction.32 Likewise, employee mobility can provide positives to the 
public through greater contributions made possible by the higher paid 
employee, as well as the reduced need to depend on public assistance. 
Finally, increased employee mobility is also a benefit for employers. When 
employees are freed from their restrictive covenants, they are easily able to 
relocate to new positions. This mobility increases the available pool of 
trained and experienced candidates. 
 
 27. See Alex Sheshunoff, 209 S.W.3d at 657 (Tex. 2006) (relying on circumstances 
outside a noncompetition agreement to hold in favor of its enforcement, such as the amount 
and proprietary nature of information obtained by the former-employee during employment 
and the duration of the employment after execution of the agreement); see also Kyle B. Sill, 
Drafting Effective Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Covenants: Considerations 
Across the United States, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 365, 371 (2013) (asserting that the 
common theme among various states with respect to noncompetition agreements is to separate 
them according to surrounding circumstances). 
 28. Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (Va. 2002) (citing Richardson 
v. Paxton Co., 127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (Va. 1962)) (examining the well-settled principles 
surrounding the validity of restrictive covenants). 
 29. See generally Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3 (commenting on the evolving law of 
noncompetition agreements and noting the difficulties states have had in finding policies that 
align with the needs of employees and employers). 
 30. Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 943 
(2012). 
 31. See Alan Frank Pryor, Balancing the Scales: Reforming Georgia’s Common Law in 
Evaluating Restrictive Covenants Ancillary to Employment Contracts, 46 GA. L. REV. 1117, 
1123 (2012) (suggesting the complexity of the laws governing restrictive covenants, through 
centuries of common law doctrine, has culminated in a nearly indiscernible body of law). 
 32. See generally Grant R. Garber, Noncompete Clauses: Employee Mobility, 
Innovation Ecosystems, and Multinational R&D Offshoring, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1079, 
1102 (2013) (discussing employee mobility (or lack thereof) as a result of the enforcement of 
noncompetition agreements and the various economic externalities born from such 
agreements). 
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At the same time, however, valid arguments remain in support of an 
employer’s use of a noncompetition agreement to limit employee mobility. 
Most people would agree that an employer should be able to protect itself 
against unfair competition, although determining the necessary degree of 
protection can prove difficult. Furthermore, allowing an employer to limit its 
employees’ mobility can encourage the employer to provide training 
opportunities—secure in the knowledge that newly acquired skills will not 
be used to compete against it. Finally, we should acknowledge and respect 
the freedom of parties to contract to the terms and conditions of employment 
without a constant threat of judicial intervention. 
Little uniformity exists in the enforcement of noncompetition 
agreements; each state analyzes noncompetition agreements from a different 
perspective.33 In a few states, a noncompetition agreement is void and 
unenforceable.34 At the other end of the spectrum, some states enforce 
virtually all noncompetition agreements.35 Thus, a noncompetition 
agreement that is enforceable in one state may not be enforced at all in 
another state; even worse, the states that do enforce these agreements are 
inconsistent.36 
A noncompetition agreement hardly rises to the level of a legally 
enforceable contract.37 Often, one cannot find the traditional elements of 
contract formation in a noncompetition agreement—the agreements may not 
contain a bargained-for exchange or a meeting of the minds.38 Consequently, 
parties to a noncompetition agreement are often uncertain as to whether the 
 
 33. See generally Sill, supra note 27 (providing an overview of judicial enforcement 
considerations to noncompetition agreements with an attention to different states’ 
interpretations of reasonable geography and scope, protectable interests and trade secrets, and 
remedies available to injured parties). 
 34. California and North Dakota have laws making virtually all noncompetition 
agreements unenforceable. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2014) (making 
contracts that restrain a party from engaging in business practices generally void); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 9-08-06 (West 2013) (prohibiting contracts that restrain anyone from conducting 
a lawful business). The North Dakota statute reflects North Dakota’s “long-standing public 
policy against restraints upon free trade.” Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 69–70 
(N.D. 2001). 
 35. See Sill, supra note 27, at 369 (“Some states are employer friendly [such as Florida], 
while others are, clearly, more employee friendly [such as California].”). 
 36. See id. at 371–73 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the agreement, the 
industry, and the employee, and the numerous considerations courts across the United States 
employ to manage the complicated issue of a restrictive covenant’s enforceability). 
 37. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 135 (contending there is an emerging trend 
among courts and legislatures to view noncompetition agreements with heightened scrutiny, 
making it more difficult to enforce such agreements). 
 38. See Sill, supra note 27, at 394–96 (discussing the issue of past consideration and 
noting there are situations where noncompetition agreements are made without new 
consideration). 
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agreement will be enforced according to its terms.39 In fact, employers may 
create clauses that they know to be unenforceable according to their terms.40 
Compounding this uncertainty, courts often give little weight to the 
agreement as it is actually written.41 Often, in states that permit enforcement 
of noncompetition agreements, the language of the agreement represents only 
a starting point.42 Unlike most other contracts, enforcement of 
noncompetition agreements depends heavily on the circumstances of its 
execution: the context in which the agreement was executed, the nature of 
the industry or profession at stake, and the status of the restricted employee.43 
In many jurisdictions, courts routinely “blue pencil” or reform covenants that 
are unreasonable, as determined by a multipart test.44 The blue pencil 
doctrine gives courts the authority to either (1) strike unreasonable clauses 
from a noncompetition agreement, leaving the rest enforceable, or (2) modify 
the agreement to reflect the terms that the parties could have, and probably 
should have, agreed to.45  
Courts have traditionally disfavored noncompetition agreements, 
believing that the agreements contravene public policy and place unfair 
restrictions on trade.46 Accordingly, the common law prohibited the use of 
 
 39. See generally Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3 (2008) (exploring the wide variation 
among the states in their different treatment of noncompetition agreements, suggesting this 
complexity and divergence breeds uncertainty as to the ultimate effect of noncompetition 
agreements). 
 40. See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 1147 (contending employers have little incentive to 
draft noncompetition agreements in compliance with legal requirements). 
 41. See id. (noting courts typically do not enforce noncompetition agreements as 
written). Virginia is an important exception; Virginia courts must interpret contracts as 
written. See Lanmark Tech., Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(“[C]ourts applying [the Virginia Supreme Court’s] three-part test must take the non-compete 
provision as written; there is no authority for courts to [‘][blue pencil] or otherwise rewrite the 
contract[’] to eliminate any illegal overbreadth.”). 
 42. See Sill, supra note 27, at 371–73 (2013) (revealing several states look at the 
language of restrictive covenants, and then only apply it where certain circumstances exist). 
 43. See id. at 373 (describing the various circumstances affecting the appropriateness of 
restrictive covenants). 
 44. See Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623, 638 n.21 (Conn. 2006) 
(“The ‘blue pencil’ rule is used to strike an unreasonable restriction ‘to the extent that a 
grammatically meaningful reasonable restriction remains after the words making the 
restriction unreasonable are stricken.’”); see also Sill, supra note 27, at 397–404 (describing 
the applicability of the blue pencil doctrine, the various circumstances that affect it, and the 
methods used by different states to apply it). 
 45. See McClanahan & Burke, supra note 21, at 1935 (identifying the strict and liberal 
blue pencil doctrines as a way in which courts are able to strike or modify the provisions of a 
noncompetition). 
 46. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 112–14 (2008) (discussing how courts 
initially found noncompetition agreements contrary to public policy); see also Ruhl v. F.A. 
Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 225 A.2d 288, 291 (Md. 1967) (“Covenants of this nature are in 
restraint of trade; the test is whether the particular restraint is reasonable on the specific 
facts.”). 
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such agreements.47 Although the restrictions on such agreements lessened 
over time,48 the common law has generally restricted their use for any 
purpose other than for legitimate business purposes.49 To ensure the purpose 
is legitimate, the law requires that a valid noncompetition agreement meet a 
reasonableness requirement.50 
To satisfy the reasonableness requirement, the employer must 
establish a reason for the noncompetition agreement other than simply 
preventing the employee from competing with his former employer.51 There 
must be some element to the competition that would make such competition 
unfair. The employer cannot base its justification on the training or 
experience gained while on the job because an employee has a right to 
acquire those skills.52 Instead, the employer must demonstrate the existence 
 
 47. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 113–14 (noting early common law forbade 
these restrictive agreements altogether). 
 48. Id. at 114 (presenting a brief history on the trend of the common law to eventually 
loosen the restrictions on noncompetition agreements). 
 49. Id. (“[S]uch agreements can be legitimate if they serve business interests other than 
the restriction of free trade.”). Courts may refuse to enforce noncompetition agreements when 
no legitimate business interest can be established. See, e.g., Allen, Gibbs & Houlik, L.C. v. 
Ristow, 94 P.3d 724, 726–27 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 
(Kan. 1996)) (holding in favor of the former employee because her training did not rise to the 
level of “specialized knowledge” of her employer’s business interests, and noting that “[i]f the 
sole purpose [of the noncompetition agreement] is to avoid ordinary competition, it is 
unreasonable and unenforceable.”). M. Scott McDonald, in his article on noncompetition 
contracts, notes several of these protectable business interests: (1) to protect trade secrets and 
confidential information of the company; (2) to protect customer goodwill developed for the 
company (customer relationships); (3) to protect overall business goodwill and assets that have 
been sold (noncompetes used in the sale of a business); (4) to protect unique and specialized 
training; (5) for situations in which the employer has contracted for the services of an 
individual of unique value because of who they are (e.g., performers, professional athletes); 
and (6) for pinnacle employees in charge of an organization. McDonald, supra note 22, at 143 
(citations omitted). 
 50. See McDonald, supra note 22, at 142–43 (explaining the law provides exceptions 
based on the “rule of reason” test). 
 51. See, e.g., Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ark. 1999) (“[T]he 
law will not protect parties against ordinary competition.”); Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. 
Hessing, 17 P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (citing McCandless v. Carpenter, 848 P.2d 
444, 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)); Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 785 (Tex. 2011) 
(Willett, J., concurring) (noting that in order to enforce a noncompetition agreement against a 
former employee “[t]he evidentiary record must demonstrate special circumstances beyond 
the bruises of ordinary competition such that, absent the covenant, [the former employee] 
would possess a grossly unfair competitive advantage”); 54A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies § 916 
(1996)) (“The burden is on the employer to prove the extent of its protectable interest. . . . The 
general rule is that an employer is not entitled to protection against ordinary competition.”); 
see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 115 (discussing the common law reasonableness 
approach, which requires the employer to demonstrate restrictions are not just a “naked 
attempt to restrict free competition”). 
 52. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 115 (contending employers may have a 
legitimate interest in preventing employees who have gained an unfair advantage from 
competing). 
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of “special circumstances” to justify the use of the noncompetition 
agreement.53 
The burden rests with the employer to show “the clause [(1)] is 
narrowly drawn to protect the employer’s legitimate business interest; [(2)] 
is not unduly burdensome on the employee’s ability to earn a living; and [(3)] 
is not against sound public policy.”54 The validity of a restrictive covenant is 
a question of law resolved in light of the language and circumstances 
surrounding the specific covenant at issue.55 Notably, courts have 
acknowledged two situations that provide sufficient justification for the 
execution of noncompetition agreements: where an employer is (1) 
protecting the goodwill of its business and (2) protecting its confidential 
information.56 
The first situation recognizes an employer’s right to protect its 
goodwill.57 An employee often generates goodwill through interactions with 
clients and by fostering personal relationships with customers. That goodwill 
does not, however, belong to the employee who has conducted business as 
an agent of the employer; rather, the goodwill is an asset of the employer.58 
The law protects these corporate customer relations as part of the “customer 
contact” theory.59 
The second sufficient justification for a noncompetition agreement 
flows from the employer’s right to protect confidential information.60 When 
 
 53. Id. at 115–16 (“An employer must demonstrate ‘special circumstances’ that make 
the agreement necessary to prevent some form of unfair competition.”). 
 54. Lanmark Tech., Inc, v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also 
Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (Va. 2002) (holding the employer bears 
the burden of showing the restraints in a noncompetition agreement are for a legitimate 
business purpose, are not oppressive towards the employee, and are not against public policy); 
Roanoke Eng’g. Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882, 885 (Va. 1982) (concluding the 
agreement was enforceable because it was no broader than necessary). 
 55. See Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S. Investigations Servs. Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 
342 (Va. 2005) (“Each non-competition agreement must be evaluated on its own merits, 
balancing the provisions of the contract with the circumstances of the businesses and 
employees involved.”). 
 56. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 116 (listing the two primary interests courts 
have been willing to recognize as legitimate business interests). 
 57. See, e.g., Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 73–74 (N.D. 2001) (noting that 
enforcement of a noncompetition agreement to protect a business’s goodwill is enforceable 
“if it is connected with the sale of the goodwill of a business”); Butler v. Arrow Mirror & 
Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787, 797 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that the enforcement of certain 
provisions of a noncompetition agreement “was necessary to protect Arrow’s [the employer] 
goodwill and business interests”); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 116 (describing 
the protection of goodwill as a common justification for enforcing a noncompetition 
agreement). 
 58. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 116 (explaining how an employee, acting 
as an agent of the employer, generates goodwill for the business). 
 59. Id. (recognizing the relational interests of the employer are protected under the 
contact theory). 
 60. See Sensabaugh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 420 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (E.D. Ark. 2006) 
(citing Duffner v. Alberty, 718 S.W.2d 111, 112 (1986)) (noting that an employer may enforce 
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an employee has procured special knowledge of “information pertaining 
especially to the employer’s business[,]” the employer has an interest in 
protecting that information by putting reasonable restraints on the 
employee.61 A covenant that is reasonable in time and geographic scope shall 
be enforced to the extent necessary “(1) to prevent an employee’s solicitation 
or disclosure of trade secrets, (2) to prevent an employee’s release of 
confidential information regarding the employer’s customers, or (3) in those 
cases where the employee’s services to the employer are deemed special or 
unique.”62 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the employee make actual use 
of the information before he is restrained. An employee’s mere ability to take 
advantage of the employer’s confidential information and thereby gain an 
unfair advantage may be sufficient for equity to restrain the employee from 
engaging in a competing business.63 An employee’s knowledge of 
confidential information is sufficient to justify enforcement of the 
noncompetition agreement when there is a substantial risk the employee will 
be able to divert all or part of the employer’s business.64 
 
a noncompetition agreement when it has “made available trade secrets, confidential business 
information, or customer lists, and then only if it is found that the [former employee] was able 
to use information so obtained to gain an unfair competitive advantage”); Evan’s World 
Travel, Inc. v. Adams, 978 S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tex. App. 1998) (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1996)) (“A trade secret may consist of any 
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that is used in one’s business and 
which gives one an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or 
use it. . . . Items such as customer lists, pricing information, client information, customer 
preferences, buyer contacts, market strategies, blueprints, and drawings have been shown to 
be trade secrets.”); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 116 (listing the protection of 
trade secrets as another protectable interest). 
 61. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 
653 (1960). 
 62. Estee Lauder Cos., v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting 
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal citations omitted). 
 63. For example, see North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Moore, where the court stated: 
It is clear that if the nature of the employment is such as will bring the employee 
in personal contact with the patrons or customers of the employer, or enable 
him to acquire valuable information as to the nature and character of the 
business and the names and requirements of the patrons or customers, enabling 
him . . . to take advantage of such knowledge of or acquaintance with the 
patrons or customers of his former employer, and thereby gain an unfair 
advantage, equity will interfere in behalf of the employer and restrain the 
breach of a negative covenant not to engage in such competing business . . . . 
 
N. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 434 (Or. 1976) (emphasis added) (quoting Kelite 
Prods., Inc. v. Brandt, 294 P.2d 320, 329 (Or. 1956)). 
 64. Id. (describing the degree to which an employee must have obtained business 
information to justify restraining that employee from competition). 
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An employer can utilize a number of other legal documents to protect 
these secrets.65 In fact, a contract may not even be required; “an employee’s 
use of an employer’s trade secrets or confidential customer information can 
be enjoined even in the absence of a restrictive covenant when such conduct 
violates a fiduciary duty owed by the former employee to his former 
employer.”66 
Nevertheless, a noncompetition agreement remains useful as a form 
of protection against the loss of confidential information. The 
noncompetition agreement protects trade secrets in the best manner 
possible—by preventing the former employee from working for a 
competitor.67 Thus, the employer is able to prevent the sharing of trade 
secrets before the disclosure ever takes place.68 A noncompetition agreement 
serves as a prophylactic remedy that aims to prevent unwanted disclosures—
rather than attempting to sue for misappropriation of trade secrets after the 
fact. 
The reasonableness requirement should balance the interests of all 
entities affected by the noncompetition agreement: the employer, the 
employee, and society as a whole. Each entity has an interest to be protected. 
The employee wishes to preserve his mobility, the employer wishes to protect 
itself from unfair competition, and society wishes to maintain a balanced 
system that provides incentives for the development and training of 
employees. With such varied interests at hand, the noncompetition agreement 
should be sculpted to satisfy all three objectives. 
D.   A Reasonable Noncompetition Agreement Must Be Restricted 
Establishing the existence of a legitimate protected business interest 
represents only a threshold requirement that an employer must meet to create 
an enforceable agreement.69 The scope of the noncompetition agreement 
must not be greater than what is necessary to protect that business interest.70 
 
 65. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 116 (“Protecting trade secrets is the second 
most common justification for employee restrictive covenants.”). 
 66. EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting 
Churchill Commc’ns Corp. v. Demyanovich, 668 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 67. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 117 (“[N]oncompete agreements are used 
as a means of minimizing the potential for trade secret misappropriation by preventing an 
employee from working for a competitor or engaging in a competing enterprise.”). 
 68. Id. (citing Blake, supra note 61, at 69–70 (“This further allows employers to prevent 
any improper use of secrets before it occurs rather than responding to a misappropriation, 
when the harm (which may be significant) is done.”). 
 69. Id. (“If the employer establishes that a legitimate interest is served by an agreement 
not to compete, the terms of the noncompetition agreement are examined to assure that it is 
no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”). 
 70. Id. at 117–18 (identifying three areas in which noncompetition agreements are 
assessed: (1) the time period of the agreement; (2) the geographic area covered; and (3) the 
business activities that are restricted by the agreement). 
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To measure an employer’s ability to protect a business interest, almost all 
courts apply a standard of reasonableness in deciding whether to enforce a 
noncompetition agreement.71 The reasonableness test measures the interests 
of the parties to the agreement. The test does not, however, adequately 
measure the interests of the public. Even in those states that purport to weigh 
the public’s interest, there is no discrete list of factors whereby a court takes 
the public’s interest into account. As discussed below, moreover, the 
“reasonableness” standard holds minimal value in the adjudication of 
noncompetition agreements.72 
Many states provide a statutory framework for the regulation of 
noncompetition agreements. In Michigan, for example, the Michigan 
Antitrust Reform Act prohibits any “contract, combination, or conspiracy 
between [two] or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or 
commerce . . . .”73 However, the statute explicitly authorizes agreements not 
to compete as long as they are reasonable.74 Section 4(a)(1) of the Act 
provides: 
An employer may obtain from an employee an agreement or 
covenant which protects an employer’s reasonable 
competitive business interests and expressly prohibits an 
employee from engaging in employment or a line of 
 
 71. Id. at 118 (concluding that courts will not enforce a noncompetition agreement that 
is broader than reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the employer); see also Reddy 
v. Cmty. Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906, 910–11 (W. Va. 1982) (finding that the enforcement 
of noncompetition agreements are subject to the “rule of reason”). 
 72. See Reddy, 298 S.E.2d at 910–12 (investigating the use of the “rule of reason” in 
constructing restrictive covenants). The court in Reddy put it best: 
Reasonableness, in the context of restrictive covenants, is a term of art, 
although it is not a term lending itself to crisp, exact definition. 
Reasonableness, as a juridical term, is generally used to define the limits of 
acceptability and thus concerns the perimeter and not the structure of the area 
it is used to describe. This general observation is nowhere more particularly 
true than with respect to a restrictive covenant. Once a contract falls within the 
rule of reason, the rule operates only as a conclusive observation and provides 
no further guidance. A court’s manipulation of the terms of an anticompetitive 
covenant, where none of its provisions standing alone is an inherently 
unreasonable one, cannot be accomplished with reasonableness as the standard. 
It is like being in the jungle—you’re either in or you’re out, and once you’re in 
the distinction is worthless for establishing your exact location. 
 
Id. at 911. 
 73. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.772 (2011). 
 74. See Coates v. Bastian Bros., 741 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“Agreements not to compete are permissible under Michigan law as long as they are 
reasonable.”) (quoting Thermatool Corp. v. Borzym, 575 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct. App 
1998)); see also Bristol Window & Door, Inc. v. Hoogenstyn, 650 N.W.2d 670, 678 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2002) (asserting that the agreement, under Michigan law, should be enforced if 
reasonable). 
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business after termination of the employment if the 
agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its duration, 
geographical area, and the type of employment or line of 
business. To the extent any such agreement or covenant is 
found to be unreasonable in any respect, a court may limit 
the agreement to render it reasonable in light of the 
circumstances in which it was made and specifically enforce 
the agreement as limited.75 
The remaining states rely on the judicial system to establish 
guidelines for enforceability.76 In common law jurisdictions, courts will 
enforce a noncompetition agreement only “if the restraint imposed is not 
unreasonable, is founded on a valuable consideration, and is reasonably 
necessary to protect the interest of the party in whose favor it is imposed, and 
does not unduly prejudice the interests of the public.”77 Many states follow 
the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which takes into 
consideration the following factors: (1) whether the restriction is greater than 
necessary to protect the business and goodwill of the employer; (2) whether 
the employer’s need for protection outweighs the economic hardship which 
the covenant imposes on the departing party; and (3) “whether the restriction 
adversely affects the interests of the public.”78 
The question of reasonableness is open to interpretation. For 
instance, in New York, courts require an employee’s noncompetition 
agreement to meet an analysis based on “an overriding limitation of 
reasonableness.”79 In Virginia, courts must consider the “function, 
geographic scope, and duration” of any restriction.80 
The reasonableness requirement is designed to take the interests of 
the employee into account. As one New York court noted: 
  
 
 75. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774(a)(1) (2011). 
 76. See Vanko, supra note 8, at 2 (“While nineteen states regulate restrictive covenants 
by statute, the rest do so by common law.”). Further, even in states with a statutory framework, 
the common law remains important. Id. at 1–2. For example, Michigan courts have clarified 
“§ 4(a)(1) represents a codification of the common-law rule ‘that the enforceability of 
noncompetition agreements depends on their reasonableness.’” St. Clair Med., P.C. v. Borgiel, 
715 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Bristol, 650 N.W.2d at 679). 
 77. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (Ga. 1992) (quoting Rakestraw 
v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 738 (Ga. 1898)). 
 78. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex. 1991); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1979) (recognizing that a 
noncompetition agreement may be invalid when the restraint is overly broad or when it 
imposes a disproportionate hardship on the employee). 
 79. Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting 
Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 753 (N.Y. 1971)). 
 80. Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (Va. 2001). 
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[O]ur economy is premised on the competition engendered 
by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas. 
Therefore, no restrictions should fetter an employee’s right 
to apply to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge 
acquired by the overall experience of his previous 
employment.81 
Courts are required to examine various factors to determine whether 
to enforce a noncompetition agreement. For instance, in Virginia, courts must 
consider a number of specific facts: “the legitimate, protectable interests of 
the employer, the nature of the former and subsequent employment of the 
employee, whether the actions of the employee actually violated the terms of 
the non-compete agreements, and the nature of the restraint in light of all the 
circumstances of the case.”82 
Once a court determines that the noncompetition agreement protects 
a legitimate business interest, it will then examine the agreement to ensure 
that it does not exceed the minimum restraint necessary to protect that 
interest.83 Courts will enforce agreements only where they are “strictly 
limited in time and territorial effect and [are] otherwise reasonable 
considering the business interest of the employer sought to be protected and 
the effect on the employee.”84 In common law jurisdictions, courts generally 
view noncompetition agreements as reasonable if they satisfy the following 
three elements: 
First, [the agreement] must [be] ancillary to an otherwise 
valid contract, transaction or relationship. Second, the 
restraint created must not be greater than necessary to 
protect the promisee’s legitimate interests such as business 
goodwill, trade secrets, or other confidential or proprietary 
information. Third, the promisee’s need for the protection 
given by the agreement must not be outweighed by either the 
hardship to the promisor or any injury likely to the public.85 
 
 81. Reed, Roberts Assocs. Inc., v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976). 
 82. Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. 2002). 
 83. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 118 (“[C]ourts . . . are reluctant to allow 
noncompetition agreements that prevent an employee from working in any position for a 
competitor or that prohibit an employee from engaging in business that is not directly 
competitive with the former employer’s business.”). 
 84. Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir. 
2005) (quoting White v. Fletcher/Mayo/Assocs., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga. 1983)). 
 85. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tex. 1991) (internal 
citations omitted). In Texas, the common law test was later codified in the Texas Business and 
Commerce Code. Id. at 386, 388 (Tex. 1991). 
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Thus, to be enforceable, agreements must be reasonable in three 
ways: scope (referring to the subject matter of the agreement), duration, and 
geography.86 
E. Limitations 
1.  Limitations on Scope of Activity 
There are two general types of “scope of activity” limitations: those 
that prohibit the employee from soliciting the employer’s customers and 
those that prohibit the employee from engaging in any competitive 
business.87 With respect to customer solicitation, “reasonable” limitations are 
valid and enforceable.88 A legitimate purpose of a noncompetition agreement 
is to prevent “employees or departing partners from using the business 
contacts and rapport established during the relationship of representing 
[a] . . . firm to take the firm’s customers with him.”89 Thus, noncompetition 
 
 86. See UARCO Inc. v. Lam, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Haw. 1998) (quoting 
Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d 163 (1976)) (noting the parameters of a reasonableness 
inquiry); see also Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. Hessing, 17 P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2001) (explaining the three factors considered in a reasonableness inquiry). 
 87. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 116–17 (discussing the primary 
justifications for employer protection under noncompetition agreements). Garrison and Wendt 
note:  
Under the so called “customer contact” theory, the relational interests of the 
former employer are protected . . . . In the protection of trade secrets, 
noncompetition agreements are used as a means of minimizing the potential 
for trade secret misappropriation by preventing an employee from working for 
a competitor or engaging in a competing enterprise. 
 
Id. (citing Blake, supra note 61, at 670) (citation omitted). 
 88. See Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1349, 
1354 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (maintaining a restrictive covenant that merely prevented the employee 
from “soliciting clients whom [the employee] served or whose names became known to [the 
employee] while at Merrill Lynch” was reasonable), aff’d, 948 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Picker Int’l v. Blanton, 756 F. Supp. 971, 982 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding a limitation barring 
the employee from servicing MRI systems that the employee serviced while with employer 
was reasonable); Inv’rs Diversified Servs., Inc. v. McElroy, 645 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. App. 
1982) (determining the limitation against soliciting customers with whom the employee dealt 
or had contact during employment was reasonable). 
 89. Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 387. Some customer solicitation limitations may be 
considered overbroad, unreasonable, and, therefore, unenforceable, at least without 
reformation. In Peat Marwick, the Texas Supreme Court held that a covenant not to compete 
was overbroad and unenforceable. See id. at 388 (“Inhibiting departing partners from engaging 
accounting services for clients who were acquired after the partner left, or with whom the 
accountant had no contact while associated with the firm, does not further and is not 
reasonably necessary to protect [the firm’s] interest.”). The covenant prohibited a former 
partner of an accounting firm from soliciting or doing business for clients acquired by the firm 
during the twenty-four-month period immediately after the partner left, or with whom the 
partner had no contact while at the firm. See id. at 383 n.3 (“Firm clients shall include any 
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agreements that only limit solicitation of those customers with whom the 
employee had daily contact on a personal level would likely be deemed 
reasonable.90 
2. Limitations on Time 
The duration of the restriction also determines the reasonableness of 
the restraint.91 Restraints with an indefinite duration are almost always 
unreasonable.92 However, it is necessary to consider the particular industry 
at issue to determine whether the particular restraint’s duration is 
reasonable.93 Some courts weigh the specific value of the protected 
information.94 For instance, in New York, the “durational reasonableness of 
 
party who was a client of the Firm as of the termination date or became such a client during 
the twenty-four-(24)-month period thereafter, or any other party in which such clients are a 
principal party in interest.”). For a scope of activity limitation of this type to be reasonable, 
there must be “a connection between the personal involvement of the former firm member 
[and] the client.” Id. at 387. Therefore, a covenant against soliciting customers should be 
limited to customers the employee had contact with during the period of employment; absent 
such a limitation, the covenant is overbroad. See id. at 388 (“We hold that the provision in 
question here is unreasonable because it applies to clients who first become clients after the 
accountant has left the firm or with whom the departing partner had no contact while he was 
at the prior firm.”). The second, and broader scope of activity limitation is one that prohibits 
any competitive activity. Texas courts generally uphold such limitations when the employer 
is engaged in only a single type of business. See Prop. Tax Assocs. Inc. v. Staffeldt, 800 
S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex. App. 1990) (stating the agreement not to compete was reasonable 
because the employer was only in one area of business). On the other hand, when an employer 
engages in a number of different types of business, such a limitation may be unreasonable, 
unless it is limited to the specific type of business in which the employee worked while 
employed. See Diversified Human Res. Grp., Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8, 11 
(Tex. App. 1988) (holding a covenant that restrained a former employee from placing 
personnel in non-related fields, rather than just the field in which she had worked, was 
unreasonable). 
 90. See Peat Marwick, 818 S.W.2d at 387 (noting provisions that are “not limited to 
clients whom the employee had served personally as an employee [are] unreasonable and 
unenforceable”) (citing Fuller v. Kolb, 234 S.E.2d 517, 518 (Ga. 1977)). 
 91. See McElroy, 645 S.W.2d at 339 (indicating a one-year restraint is well within 
reasonable bounds). 
 92. See, e.g., Taylor v. Saurman, 1 A. 40, 41 (Pa. 1885) (declaring a covenant not to 
re-engage in photography void as against public policy). 
 93. See Bob Pagan Ford, Inc. v. Smith, 638 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App. 1982) 
(describing the discretionary standard for trial courts to find noncompetition covenants 
reasonable). In determining whether a restrictive covenant is reasonable as to duration, the 
trial court is accorded considerable discretion, and it is appropriate for the court to consider 
whether the interests which the covenant was designed to protect are still outstanding and to 
balance those interests against the hardships which would be imposed upon the employee by 
enforcement of the restrictions. Id. 
 94. See Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906, 914 (W. Va. 1982) (weighing 
the time period for a noncompetition agreement based on when an employee’s training costs 
have been recovered). 
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a non-compete agreement is judged by the length of time for which the 
employer’s confidential information will be competitively valuable.”95 
The courts’ inconsistent analyses under this fact-specific inquiry is 
frustrating. As one commentator states: 
A look at the cases finds courts upholding restrictive 
covenants that last as long as five or ten years, while 
invalidating others that last only one or two years. Moreover, 
courts in the same jurisdiction will uphold a three-year 
limitation in one case but invalidate it in another. 
Unfortunately, in so doing the courts seldom attempt to 
reconcile their decisions, except perhaps by saying that each 
case must be decided on its own facts. In reviewing the 
cases, one could decide that the decisions are totally 
serendipitous and would not be far wrong. However, luck 
and good fortune are not particularly helpful when drafting 
clauses.96 
A review of case law indicates most courts usually uphold time 
limitations of one or two years.97 Limitations of three to five years may be 
upheld in the sale of a business, but decisions conflict as to whether a three- 
to five-year limitation is reasonable in an employment situation.98 
3. Limitations on Geography 
The geographical limitation in noncompetition agreements must be 
definite.99 An indefinite description of the geographical area should render 
 
 95. Estee Lauder Cos., v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also 
Bus. Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F.Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Within 
a year [the former employee’s] knowledge of these matters will be outdated and of little use.”). 
 96. 1 KURT H. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 127 (2d ed. 1993). 
 97. See Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1349, 
1354 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (finding a one-year limitation on solicitation of former clients 
reasonable); Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Blanton, 756 F. Supp. 971, 982 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding a 
one-year limit on competition was reasonable); Inv’rs Diversified Servs., Inc. v. McElroy, 645 
S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. App. 1982) (“The one year restraint involved here is certainly 
reasonable . . . .”); 1 DECKER, supra note 96, at 126 (“Clauses such as the following restraining 
competition with established customers for set periods of time have been enforced: . . . [f]or a 
period of [twenty-four] months.”). 
 98. Texas cases provide a representative array of decisions. Compare Prop. Tax Assocs., 
Inc. v. Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. App. 1990) (“The courts of this state have upheld 
restrictions ranging from two to five years as reasonable.”), and Inv’rs Diversified, 645 
S.W.2d at 339 (“Two to five years have repeatedly been held to be reasonable.”), with Bob 
Pagan Ford, 638 S.W.2d at 178–79 (upholding trial court’s decision to reform the restricted 
period under an employment agreement from three years to six months). 
 99. See Gomez v. Zamora, 814 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. App. 1991) (“Indefinite 
descriptions of the area covered by a non-competition covenant render them unenforceable as 
written.”). 
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the agreement unenforceable as written.100 Nevertheless, even a worldwide 
restriction may, under the right circumstances, reach the required standard of 
reasonableness.101 The particular nature of the employer’s business may 
cover a wide geographic limitation that would otherwise appear to be 
hopelessly overbroad.102 
Numerous courts have held a reasonable area consists of the territory 
in which the former employee worked while employed.103 Beyond this 
general rule, however, what constitutes a reasonable geographical area 
invariably depends upon the facts of the specific case.104 
Traditionally, the reasonableness of a geographic limitation was 
directly related to the location of the territory in which the employee worked 
for his former employer.105 As such, courts have held geographic restraints 
are reasonable where “the area of the restraint is no broader than the territory 
 
 100. See Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversifoods, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. App. 1992) 
(holding the language “‘metropolitan area’ of the Parkdale Mall store in Beaumont, Texas” 
indefinite and unenforceable); Gomez, 814 S.W.2d at 117–18 (holding the language “existing 
marketing area” and “future marketing area of the employer begun during employment” 
indefinite and unenforceable). 
 101. See Bus. Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (finding a worldwide restriction on competition reasonable where the former 
employer’s scope of business was global). 
 102. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“[B]road geographic limitations have been deemed reasonable where warranted by the nature 
and scope of the employer’s business.”); Hudson, 580 F. Supp. at 1072–73 (concluding the 
worldwide restrictions were reasonable “given the international nature of [the employer’s] 
business”). 
 103. Once again, Texas decisions provide a representative example. See Zep Mfg. Co. v. 
Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Tex. App. 1992) (citing Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 
681, 685 (Tex. 1973)) (internal citations omitted) (“[W]hat constitutes a reasonable area 
generally is considered to be the territory in which the employee worked while in the 
employment of his employer.”); Diversified Human Res. Grp., Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 
S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding a restriction against working within fifty miles of any 
city where the former employer operated was overbroad given that the employee had only 
worked in one of these cities during her employment); Martin v. Linen Sys. for Hosps., Inc., 
671 S.W.2d 706, 709–10 (Tex. App. 1984) (upholding the trial court’s modification of a 
noncompetition agreement, changing the restricted scope from a ten-mile radius of any 
customer to only a ten-mile radius of the employer’s main offices); Cross v. Chem-Air S., 
Inc., 648 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App. 1983) (internal citations omitted) (citing Gillen v. 
Diadrill, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. App. 1981)) (“The test for reasonableness as to 
territorial restraint is whether or not the injunction is confined to territory actually covered by 
the former employee in his work for the employer.”). 
 104. See Martin, 671 S.W.2d at 709 (noting Texas courts have reformed non-compete 
agreements to “whatever is reasonable in time and scope under the circumstances, depending 
largely upon the nature and extent of the employer’s business operations”). 
 105. See Justin Belt, 502 S.W.2d at 685 (“[T]he territory that is included [is an] important 
factor[] to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the agreement.”); see also 
Butler v. Arrow Mirror & Glass, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Tex. App. 2001) (upholding the 
trial court’s reformation of a covenant not to compete to include only the counties in which 
the employee interacted with his former employer’s customers). 
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throughout which the employee was able to establish contact with his 
employer’s customers during the term of his employment.”106 
II.   COURTS MAY USE THE BLUE PENCIL DOCTRINE TO MODIFY 
UNREASONABLE AGREEMENTS 
A. Explaining the Blue Pencil Doctrine 
At common law, courts rarely enforced unreasonable agreements 
only in part.107 An agreement made unreasonable by an employer’s attempt 
to overextend its prohibitions would be either invalidated or the offending 
passage would be severed.108 The blue pencil doctrine is a “judicial standard 
for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the offending 
words.”109 This doctrine is based, in large part, on the “understanding that 
there is not necessarily a sinister purpose behind an overbroad restrictive 
covenant.”110 Courts can and do look to the good faith of the employer when 
determining whether to use the blue pencil doctrine.111 
Use of the blue pencil doctrine differs from state to state. Among 
those states that enforce noncompetition agreements, three schools of thought 
 
 106. Todd M. Foss, Comment, Texas, Covenants Not to Compete, and the Twenty-First 
Century: Can the Pieces Fit Together in a Dot.Com Business World?, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX 
L.J. 207, 225 (2003) (citation omitted). Compare Curtis v. Ziff Energy Grp., 12 S.W.3d 114, 
119 (Tex. App. 2000) (“Based on [the former employee’s] job description and responsibilities 
[as Vice President in charge of marketing], it was reasonable to restrict [the former employee] 
from working in [similar firms] in North America for a six month period, and it did not impose 
an unnecessary restraint.”), with Evan’s World Travel, Inc. v. Adams, 978 S.W.2d 225, 233 
(Tex. App. 1998) (holding unreasonable a restraint which had “no language which tailor[ed] 
the geographical restrictions to keep [the former employee] from working in only geographical 
areas where she worked, but rather, the limitations in the agreement purport[ed] to prevent her 
from working anywhere [the former employer] conducted business”). 
 107. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 3, at 118 (“Under the common law, courts were 
reluctant to partially enforce unreasonable postemployment restrictions.”). 
 108. Id. at 118–19 (“An overbroad agreement was either void per se or subject to 
severance under the ‘blue pencil’ doctrine.”). 
 109. Blue Pencil Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 110. See Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906, 914 (W. Va. 1982) (explaining 
why the court will allow the blue pencil doctrine in some situations). “In most cases, the 
promise is not required by the employer because he is a hardhearted oppressor of the poor. He 
too is engaged in the struggle for prosperity and must bend every effort to gain and to retain 
the good will of his customers. It is the function of the law to maintain a reasonable balance.” 
Id. (quoting 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394, at 89 (1962)). 
 111. Id. at 916 (discussing whether or not the court will find a covenant void or subject 
it to “judicial moulding”). If the reviewing court is satisfied that the covenant is reasonable on 
its face, hence within the perimeter of the rule of reason, it may then proceed with analysis 
leading to a “rule of best result.” Pursuant to that analysis, the court may narrow the covenant 
so that it conforms to the actual requirements of the parties. Id. 
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exist.112 As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
summarized: 
Courts presented with restrictive covenants containing 
unenforceable provisions have taken three approaches: (1) 
the “all or nothing” approach, which would void the 
restrictive covenant entirely if any part is unenforceable, (2) 
the “blue pencil” approach, which enables the court to 
enforce the reasonable terms provided the covenant remains 
grammatically coherent once its unreasonable provisions are 
excised, and (3) the “partial enforcement” approach, which 
reforms and enforces the restrictive covenant to the extent it 
is reasonable, unless the “circumstances indicate bad faith or 
deliberate overreaching” on the part of the employer.113 
As noted above, some states follow a “no modification” approach to 
noncompetition agreements.114 Also known as the “all or nothing” rule, this 
approach precludes the use of the blue pencil doctrine.115 Courts adhering to 
this approach refrain from either rewriting or striking overbroad provisions 
in noncompetition agreements.116 Rather, in no-modification states, courts 
first determine whether the restrictive covenant is reasonable as written; if it 
is not, courts will not modify or eliminate provisions, but will instead refuse 
to enforce the agreement at all.117 
The second approach is known as the “strict blue pencil” rule. The 
strict blue pencil rule does not allow courts to rewrite overbroad 
noncompetition agreements.118 If a court strictly applies the blue pencil 
doctrine, “only the offending words are invalidated if it would be possible to 
delete them simply by running a blue pencil through them, as opposed to 
changing, adding, or rearranging words.”119 The strict approach only permits 
courts to strike overbroad provisions and enforce what is left of the 
agreement. Thus, the agreement is only enforceable if it is reasonably limited 
after the overbroad provisions have been removed.120 
 
 112. Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1469 
(1st Cir. 1992) (citing Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods. Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I. 1989)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Diversified Human Res. Grp., Inc. v. Levinson-Polakoff, 752 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex. 
App. 1988). 
 118. See Deustche Post Glob. Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 292 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (D. Md. 
2003) (citing Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 794, 802 (1991)) (explaining that the strict 
approach is “limited to removing the offending language without supplementing or 
rearranging the remaining language”). 
 119. Blue Pencil Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 120. See Broadway & Seymour, Inc. v. Wyatt, 944 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1991) (contrasting 
the strict North Carolina blue pencil rule with the liberal Florida approach). 
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Finally, other states have adopted a liberal form of the blue pencil 
doctrine: the “reasonable modification” approach.121 Some courts refer to this 
as the “equitable modification” rule.122 These states permit a court to rewrite 
an overbroad noncompetition agreement to reasonably limit the restrictions 
found in it. 
B. The No-Modification States 
The blue pencil doctrine, although used in a majority of states, is not 
universal. Certain states, notably Virginia and Wisconsin, follow the “no-
modification” rule. This rule recognizes the inequities inherent in a rule that 
imposes an agreement on the parties that was not part of the original 
bargained-for agreement. 
Courts in Virginia evaluate the noncompetition agreement as written 
without revising or eliminating provisions. Virginia courts lack the authority 
to “‘blue pencil’ or otherwise rewrite the contract” to eliminate any illegal 
overbreadth.123 Ambiguous language susceptible to two or more differing 
interpretations, one of which is functionally overbroad, renders the entire 
noncompetition agreement unenforceable. This remains true even though the 
agreement may be reasonable in the context of the factors present.124 
Wisconsin has codified its “no blue pencil rule” in section 103.465 
of the Wisconsin Statutes. According to the statute, “[a]ny covenant [not to 
compete] . . . imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and 
unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would 
be a reasonable restraint.”125 
C. The Strict Blue Pencil States 
The strict blue pencil doctrine permits only the removal of 
unreasonable contractual provisions. The court is not permitted to revise or 
add language to the agreement. The strict blue pencil doctrine attempts to 
restrict employer overreaching by removing the offending provisions and 
leaving an otherwise enforceable agreement.126 Courts use the strict blue 
pencil rule to strike an unreasonable restriction “to the extent that a 
 
 121. See, e.g., Steiner v. Am. Friends of Lubavitch (Chabad), 177 A.3d 1246 (D.C. 2018). 
 122. See, e.g., Graham v. Cirocco, 69 P.3d 194, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003). 
 123. See Pais v. Automation Prods., Inc., 36 Va. Cir. 230, 239 (1995). 
 124. Lanmark Tech. Inc. v. Canales, 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
 125. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2019). 
 126. Deustche Post Glob. Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 292 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (D. Md. 2003) 
(citing Fowler v. Printers II, Inc., 598 A.2d 794, 802 (1991)) (The strict approach is “limited 
to removing the offending language without supplementing or rearranging the remaining 
language.”). 
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grammatically meaningful reasonable restriction remains after the words 
making the restriction unreasonable are stricken.”127 
Indiana provides an example of a jurisdiction that uses the strict blue 
pencil doctrine. When reviewing noncompetition agreements, Indiana courts 
have historically enforced reasonable restrictions but have also struck 
unreasonable restrictions, provided they are divisible.128 Although the 
practice is long-standing, Indiana courts did not use the label “blue pencil 
doctrine” until 1982.129 
Under Indiana law, “when an employer drafts an overly broad 
covenant, the price of over-reaching is that the restriction cannot be enforced 
at all, even if it would have been possible to draft and enforce a narrower, 
more reasonable restriction.”130 Even in those cases where the equities of the 
situation might suggest enforcement, courts have no alternative but to reject 
the overly broad clause rather than modify it.131 If, however, the 
noncompetition agreement is clearly separated into parts, and if some parts 
are reasonable and others are not, the offending clauses may be severed so 
that the reasonable portions may be enforced.132 The court is constrained in 
that it may apply only the terms within the contract and cannot add terms.133 
Similarly, in Arizona, although courts will not add terms or rewrite 
provisions of covenants,134 they will blue pencil restrictive covenants, 
 
 127. A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Cent. 
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 36 (Tenn. 1984)). In Beit v. Beit, 63 A.2d 
161 (Conn. 1948), the court stated: 
There is undoubtedly a strong tendency on the part of courts to regard as divisible restraints 
of trade which are unreasonable in the extent of area covered and to hold them invalid only so 
far as necessary for the protection of the covenantee, where the terms of the promise permit 
that to be done without clearly violating the intent of the parties. . . . A restrictive covenant 
which contains or may be read as containing distinct undertakings bounded by different limits 
of space or time, or different in subject matter, may be good as to part and bad as to part. But 
this does not mean that a single covenant may be artificially split up in order to pick out some 
part of it that it can be upheld. Severance is permissible only in the case of a covenant which 
is in effect a combination of several distinct covenants. Where the covenant is intended by the 
parties to be an entirety, it cannot properly be so divided by a court that it will be held good 
for a certain area but invalid for another; indeed . . . this would be to make an agreement for 
the parties into which they did not voluntarily enter. 
Id. at 165–66 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 128. See Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66, 69 (1884); Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200, 203–
05 (1855); Bennett v. Carmichael Produce Co., 115 N.E. 793, 795–96 (Ind. App. 1917). 
 129. See Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
 130. Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (S.D. Ind. 2007); see 
also Young v. Van Zandt, 449 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ind. App. 1983) (“If the covenant is not 
reasonable as written, the court may not create a reasonable restriction under the guise of 
interpretation, since this would subject the parties to an agreement they had not made.”). 
 131. Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 241 (Ind. 1955). 
 132. Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983) (“[I]f the 
covenant is clearly separated into parts and some parts are reasonable and others are not, the 
contract may be held divisible.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999). 
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“eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions.”135 In the 
case of severable clauses, an Arizona court can enforce the lawful parts and 
ignore the unlawful parts.136 Even though Arizona courts are permitted to 
prune contracts, they cannot rewrite them for the parties.137 The strict blue 
pencil doctrine will not save those documents that would require the court to 
rewrite the durational requirement or add geographic limitations.138 In short, 
the strict blue pencil doctrine in Arizona permits courts to consider separate 
clauses separately, but without severable language to excise to render an 
agreement reasonable, courts are without power to enforce the agreement. 
Notably, in strict blue pencil states, if the agreement fails to meet the 
standard of reasonableness in any of the three areas—scope, duration, or 
geography—the court will find the entire agreement unenforceable. For 
instance, in Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber,139 the Arizona Supreme 
Court addressed the enforceability of a non-compete clause prohibiting a 
departing physician from practicing medicine within a five-mile radius of any 
of three specific clinic locations for a period of three years.140 The contract 
also had a reformation clause that allowed a court, if necessary, to amend the 
non-compete provision to make it enforceable.141 Despite the reformation 
clause, the court held that the non-compete was unenforceable because both 
the scope of the activity prohibited and duration were unreasonable.142 Thus, 
the reformation clause did not permit the appellate court to rewrite the non-
compete provision “in an attempt to make it enforceable.”143 The court 
explained that, under Arizona law, courts may blue-pencil a covenant by 
“eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions,” but they are 
prohibited from adding or rewriting provisions.144 
Some courts in strict blue pencil states have indicated that they prefer 
not to narrow the scope of a clause because the parties did not agree to new 
terms.145 The strict blue pencil rule holds that a court may not, under the guise 
of interpretation, redraft a noncompetition agreement to make it more 
reasonable or narrow.146 
The Georgia Supreme Court explained the proper use of the strict 
blue pencil doctrine. The court explained that under such an approach, “[t]he 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Olliver/Pilcher Ins., Inc. v. Daniels, 715 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Ariz. 1986). 
 137. Id. (citing E. Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 189 S.E.2d 22, 24 (S.C. 1972)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d 1277. 
 140. Id. at 1279. 
 141. Id. at 1285 n.2. 
 142. Id. at 1284–85. 
 143. Id. at 1286. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Dicen v. New Sesco, Inc., 839 N.E.2d 684, 689 (Ind. 2005); Burk v. Heritage 
Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 811–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
 146. See Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983). 
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‘blue pencil’ marks, but does not write.”147 The United States Court of 
Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit has explained that in a strict blue pencil 
jurisdiction, courts “cannot rewrite . . . restrictive covenants, inserting 
clauses and providing sufficient limitations so as to render the restrictions 
reasonable and enforceable . . . .”148 
West Virginia courts follow a similar approach regarding the 
enforcement of noncompetition agreements.149 These courts follow a “rule of 
reason” that determines the enforceability of any noncompetition 
covenant.150 Under this rule, the courts should approach restrictive covenants 
with “grave reservations.”151 In West Virginia, therefore, a covenant that is 
unreasonable on its face is utterly void and unenforceable.152 For instance, an 
excessively broad covenant with respect to time or geographic scope is 
unreasonable on its face.153 
The West Virginia Supreme Court attempted to distinguish the 
difference between a threshold reasonableness analysis and a subsequent 
approach. In determining whether a covenant is unreasonable on its face, the 
court must keep in mind that such a determination is a threshold question: 
Our courts should approach the available authority with 
respect to time and area limitations with caution. Most other 
courts fail to use the distinction we have adopted between a 
threshold inquiry as to the reasonableness of the covenant 
and a “rule of best result” within the general ambit of the 
rule of reason. Those courts use rule of reason language well 
past the threshold inquiry, and their standard of 
reasonableness for purposes of shaving the covenant to 
reasonable proportions should not be confused with a 
standard of “reasonableness on its face” for the purpose of 
deciding whether the covenant merits further scrutiny.154 
In North Carolina, an unreasonably broad provision also renders the 
entire covenant unenforceable. Under North Carolina law, “equity will 
 
 147. New Atlanta Ear, Nose & Throat Assocs., P.C. v. Pratt, 560 S.E.2d 268, 273 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Hamrick v. Kelley, 392 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 1990)); see Watson v. 
Waffle House, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985); Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 80 (Ga. 1972). 
 148. Donovan v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 181 F. App’x 782, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting New 
Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d at 273). 
 149. See Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 73 S.E.2d 438, 440–43 (W. Va. 1952). 
 150. Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906, 915 (W. Va. 1982). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (“No court should trouble itself to rewrite an inherently unreasonable covenant 
to bring the covenant within the rule of reason.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 915 n.7. 
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neither enforce nor reform an overreaching and unreasonable covenant.”155 
More specifically, while North Carolina’s blue pencil rule severely limits 
what the court may do to alter an unenforceable covenant, a court “may 
choose not to enforce a distinctly severable part of a covenant in order to 
render the provision reasonable.”156 
D. The Liberal Blue Pencil States 
The liberal blue pencil doctrine permits a court greater leeway to 
substantively change an agreement. Courts may use the blue pencil doctrine 
to modify an unreasonable noncompetition agreement and enforce the 
agreement only to the extent that it is reasonable.157 A court may thus use the 
liberal blue pencil approach to modify the covenant so that it is no broader 
than what is reasonably necessary to protect the employer.158 
In Minnesota, a liberal blue pencil state, courts face few limits on 
their equitable powers. In the case of Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham 
Lake, Inc.,159 for instance, the court stated that it had the power and discretion 
to modify an employment contract or not, depending upon equitable 
considerations and the particular facts of the case.160 
Illinois also follows the liberal blue pencil rule, allowing courts “to 
modify . . . unreasonable terms of an agreement in order to make it 
reasonable.”161 
New Jersey is another example of a jurisdiction that applies the blue 
pencil rule liberally. There, when restrictive covenants are found to violate 
the reasonableness test, rather than deem the covenants void ab initio, courts 
will enforce them to the extent that is reasonable under the circumstances.162 
This principle of partial enforcement does not depend upon mechanical 
divisibility of a contract clause, but rather asks whether or not “partial 
enforcement is possible without injury to the public and without injustice to 
the parties.”163 
Likewise, Pennsylvania courts also view the blue pencil doctrine 
liberally. Even when confronted with a “limitless” restriction that would 
render a noncompetition clause inherently unreasonable, a court may still 
 
 155. Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 912, 917 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Beasley v. Banks, 368 S.E.2d 885, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)). 
 156. Id. at 920. 
 157. Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977). 
 158. Id. 
 159. 372 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 160. Id. at 88–89. 
 161. Joy v. Hay Grp., Inc., No. 02C4989, 2003 WL 22118930, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 
2003). 
 162. See Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc. v. Aiken, 198 A.2d 136, 140 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1964) (citing Chas. S. Wood & Co. v. Kane, 125 A.2d 872, 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1956)). 
 163. Solari Indus. Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 57 (N.J. 1970) (citing Ceresia v. Mitchell, 
242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1951)) (internal citations omitted). 
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save the agreement.164 Under Pennsylvania law, a court sitting in equity may 
grant enforcement of an overbroad covenant and, to cure the overbreadth, has 
the power to craft a restriction to make it reasonable and enforceable.165 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire also follow the liberal blue 
pencil doctrine. In Massachusetts, “courts will not invalidate an unreasonable 
noncompetition covenant completely but will enforce it to the extent that it 
is reasonable.”166 In New Hampshire, “[e]ven if the trial court determines that 
the covenant is unreasonable, the employer nonetheless may be entitled to 
equitable relief in the form of reformation or partial enforcement of an overly 
broad covenant upon a showing of his exercise of good faith in the execution 
of the employment contract.”167 
Maine follows the most unusual method of applying the liberal blue 
pencil doctrine. In Maine, the courts completely disregards the agreement as 
drafted and agreed to by the parties.168 Instead, courts consider the scope of 
the covenant only as the employer seeks to enforce it.169 In essence, the 
alleged bargained-for exchange between the parties lacks all meaning. This 
unique interpretation of the blue pencil doctrine was developed in Chapman 
& Drake v. Harrington,170 in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
wrote the following: “Since the reasonableness of the noncompetition 
agreement depends upon the specific facts of the case . . . we assess that 
agreement only as . . . [the plaintiff] has sought to apply it and not as it might 
have been enforced on its plain terms.”171 
III.   MANY STATE COURTS DISFAVOR THE BLUE PENCIL 
In recent years, many state courts have criticized the use of the blue 
pencil doctrine. I review those cases below. 
Nevada  
In July 2016, the Nevada Supreme Court confirmed that 
noncompetition agreements that go “beyond what is necessary” to protect the 
former employer’s interests are unreasonable and unenforceable.172 In 
Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam,173 the court further urged “exercise of 
 
 164. Hillard v. Medtronic, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 173, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
 165. Id.; Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 254 (Pa. 1976). 
 166. L.G. Balfour Co. v. McGinnis, 759 F. Supp. 840, 845 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing All 
Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308 N.E.2d 481, 485 (Mass. 1974)) (internal citations omitted). 
 167. Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1311 (N.H. 1979). 
 168. See Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995). 
 169. Everett J. Prescott, Inc. v. Ross, 383 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190 (D. Me. 2005); Brignull, 
666 A.2d at 84. 
 170. 545 A.2d 645 (Me. 1988). 
 171. Id. at 647 (citing Am. Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Vodra, 385 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Neb. 1986)). 
 172. Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 153 (Nev. 2016). 
 173. Id. at 151. 
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judicial restraint when confronted with the urge to pick up the [blue] 
pencil.”174 
In that case, the employee, Sumona Islam, executed several 
documents, including a noncompetition agreement, with her employer, 
Atlantis Casino.175 The agreement prohibited Islam from employment at, or 
in association with, any other gaming establishment within 150 miles of the 
Atlantis Casino.176 The restriction called for a term of one year from the 
termination of employment.177 
Three years later, Islam left her job to take a position with a 
competitor, Grand Sierra Resort. Before leaving, however, she altered and 
concealed the contact information of eighty-seven players in the Atlantis 
electronic database.178 She also copied the names of casino players, their 
contact information, level of play, game preferences, credit limits, and other 
proprietary information from the Atlantis database into her personal 
notebook. Shortly after starting her position with her new employer, Islam 
placed the information that she copied from the Atlantis database into the 
Grand Sierra database. Because it believed that Islam’s information came 
from previous relationships, Grand Sierra marketed its casinos to the Atlantis 
clients. 
Despite the unusual circumstances, the Nevada Supreme Court 
found that Islam’s noncompetition agreement was unreasonable, given that 
it restricted more than what is necessary to protect Atlantis’s interests.179 The 
court also held that the agreement, which restricted her ability to find 
employment, unduly burdened Islam.180 
The court refused to take up the blue pencil and modify or strike 
terms from the agreement to make it reasonable. The court stated, 
“[r]ightfully, we have long refrained from reforming or blue-penciling” 
private parties’ contracts.181 The Golden Road court noted the potential for 
abuse by employers of the blue pencil doctrine. The court cited with favor 
the Georgia Supreme Court’s opinion in Richard P. Rita Personnel Services 
International, Inc. v. Kot.182 In that case, the court warned of the 
consequences of a court’s modification of a noncompetition agreement, 
cautioning that “if severance is generally applied, employers can fashion 
truly ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and 
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enforced when the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable . . . .”183 As 
the Golden Road court noted, 
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are 
thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees 
who respect their contractual obligations and on competitors 
who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor, 
or who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with 
their competitors.184 
The Nevada Supreme Court criticized the blue pencil doctrine by 
noting three negative aspects of the doctrine: (1) the modification of a 
contract creates the possibility of “trampling the parties’ contractual intent”; 
(2) the need to preserve judicial resources; and (3) the requirement to take 
notice of the employer’s superior bargaining position.185 
The court reiterated that its decision to show restraint “is sound 
public policy. Restraint avoids the possibility of trampling the parties’ 
contractual intent.”186 The court noted that committing any trespass on the 
parties’ intent, even a slight one, “is indefensible, as our use of the pencil 
should not lead us to the place of drafting.”187 Instead, the court noted that 
the judicial system should refrain from creating new agreements. “Drafting 
would simply be inappropriate public policy as it conflicts with the 
impartiality that is required of the bench.”188 
Second, a court’s restraint preserves judicial resources. Restraint is 
consistent with basic principles of contract law that hold the drafter to a 
higher standard.189 The court recognized that re-drafting a contract wastes 
time and resources. Expending the time and energy of the court on such 
drafting “is unwarranted and blurs the line between the bench and the bar.”190 
Courts lack the power to make private agreements. “Such actions are simply 
not within the judicial province.”191 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the court emphasized the 
disparity in bargaining power between the employer and its employee. “A 
contract must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared it, 
and favorably to a party who had no voice in the selection of its language.”192 
Courts apply a strict test of reasonableness to restrictive covenants in 
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employment cases because of the nature of the employee–employer 
relationship. As the Golden Road court noted, “one who has nothing but his 
labor to sell, and is in urgent need of selling that, cannot well afford to raise 
any objection to any terms of the contract of employment offered to him, so 
long as the wages are acceptable.”193 Thus, the contract terms should be 
construed against the employer. 
Use of the blue pencil to amend an agreement favors the employer. 
The employer 
holds a superior bargaining position, and . . . drafts a 
contract that is greater than required for its protection and is 
thereafter rewarded with the court’s legal drafting aid, as the 
other party faces economic impairment, restrained in his 
trade. In the context of an agreement that is in restraint of 
trade, a good-faith presumption benefiting the employer is 
unwarranted.194 
The court found that its refusal to modify any unreasonable 
agreement discourages employers from getting the benefits of a “free ride,” 
secure in the knowledge that a court will correct their mistakes.195 
Nebraska 
In 2015, the Nebraska Supreme court had a similar opportunity to 
decide whether or not Nebraska courts should utilize the blue pencil doctrine 
to modify unreasonable noncompetition agreements. In Unlimited 
Opportunity, Inc. v. Waadah,196 the court analyzed a noncompetition clause 
contained in a franchise agreement between the franchisor, Jani-King, and 
franchisee, Waadah. The agreement contained a clause that barred its 
franchisees from competing with Jani-King following termination of the 
agreement. The clause prohibited a franchisee from operating the same or a 
similar business within the territory of the agreement for two years.197 The 
clause further prohibited a franchisee from operating for a period of one year 
a competing business in any other territory in which a Jani-King franchise 
operated.198 
The trial court objected to the scope of the territorial restraint. The 
court found that the limitation was unreasonable because it prevented 
Waadah from working “in any other territory in which a Jani-King franchise 
operates.”199 Because Jani-King did business around the world, the court 
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found the geographic limitation to be unreasonably large, given that it 
prevented, in theory at least, Waadah from competing anywhere in the world. 
Jani-King appealed, claiming that the noncompetition agreement was not 
unreasonable, because it had never attempted to enforce it. The Nebraska 
appellate court ruled in favor of Waadah.200 
In its decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court criticized the use of the 
blue pencil doctrine. The court stated that “it is not the function of the courts 
to reform a covenant not to compete in order to make it enforceable.”201 Once 
again, it rejected the blue pencil rule, stating that “we must either enforce [a 
covenant] as written or not enforce it at all.”202 The court cited “important 
public policy considerations” to justify their finding.203 The court rejected 
contract reformation “because it creates uncertainty in employees’ 
contractual relationships with franchisors, increases the potential for 
confusion by parties to a contract, and encourages litigation of noncompete 
clauses in contracts.”204 
New York  
Other courts have recently cautioned against the use of the blue 
pencil. For example, the New York Court of Appeals, New York’s highest 
court, warned employers that courts may refuse to blue pencil restrictive 
covenants if their formation involved the “coercive use of dominant 
bargaining power.”205 In Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, the court noted 
that the employee at issue was not employed at the time that she signed the 
covenant.206 This raised questions as to whether that “caused her to feel 
pressure to sign the agreement rather than risk being unemployed.”207 The 
Brown court noted that a “case-specific analysis” was necessary to determine 
these surrounding circumstances.208 The court found that the presence of fact 
issues prevented summary judgment.209  
North Carolina 
North Carolina courts view noncompetition agreements with 
suspicion. Covenants not to compete are disfavored in North Carolina.210 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 441 (citing CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman, 518 N.W.2d 652 (Neb. 1994)). 
 202. Id. (citing Newman, 518 N.W.2d at 656). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (citing Pivateau, supra note 186, at 672). 
 205. Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, 34 N.E.3d 357, 362 (N.Y. 2015) (quoting BDO 
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226 (N.Y. 1999)).  
 206.  Id. at 362. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. (quoting Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d at 1226). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 546 (N.C. 1944); VisionAIR, Inc. v. James, 606 
S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
2019] RESTRICTING THE BLUE PENCIL DOCTRINE 33 
They are valid only if they are “(1) in writing; (2) made a part of the 
employment contract; (3) based on valuable consideration; (4) reasonable as 
to time and territory; and (5) designed to protect a legitimate business interest 
of the employer.”211 The restrictions on an employee’s future employment 
“must be no wider in scope than is necessary to protect the business of the 
employer.”212 More specifically, “restrictive covenants are unenforceable 
where they prohibit the employee from engaging in future work that is 
distinct from the duties actually performed by the employee.”213 
In March 2016, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected a lower 
court’s modification of an overly broad noncompetition agreement. In 
Beverage Systems of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Beverage Repair, 
LLC, the court noted that “blue-penciling is the process by which ‘a court of 
equity will take notice of the divisions the parties themselves have made [in 
a covenant not to compete], and enforce the restrictions in the territorial 
divisions deemed reasonable and refuse to enforce them in the divisions 
deemed unreasonable.’”214 The Beverage Systems court, however, reaffirmed 
North Carolina’s strict interpretation of the blue pencil rule, which permits a 
court to strike overbroad restrictions but not to create new ones to take their 
place.215 “[W]hen an agreement not to compete is found to be unreasonable 
. . . the court is powerless unilaterally to amend the terms of the contract.”216 
The court was not swayed by the language of the agreement, which 
expressly gave to the court the power to modify the territorial restriction if 
the court found it to be overbroad.217 The court noted that “parties cannot 
contract to give a court a power that it does not have.”218 Because striking the 
unreasonable territory provision resulted in “no territory left within which to 
enforce the covenant not to compete,” the court refused to enforce the 
noncompetition agreement.219 
The court criticized the notion that courts should substitute their 
terms for those of the parties to the contract, writing, “Courts are not at liberty 
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to rewrite contracts for the parties. We are not their guardians, but the 
interpreters of their words. We must, therefore, determine what they meant 
by what they have said—what their contract is, and not what it should have 
been.”220 The court criticized the idea that the parties could “assign their 
drafting duties as parties to a contract.”221 Permitting this modification would 
reduce the court to the “role of scrivener, making judges postulate new terms 
that the court hopes the parties would have agreed to be reasonable at the 
time the covenant was executed or would find reasonable after the court 
rewrote the limitation.”222 The court concluded that it saw “nothing but 
mischief in allowing such a procedure.”223 
Similarly, in a recent case applying North Carolina law, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to modify an overbroad 
agreement.224 The employer sought to enjoin a former employee from 
working for a competitor, citing a noncompetition agreement that stated the 
employee could “not directly or indirectly participate in a business that is 
similar to a business now or later operated by Employer in the same 
geographical area.”225 The court found several problems with this 
language.226 First, the scope of the restricted activity was created by reference 
to a competitor, thus preventing the former employee from working for a 
competitor in any capacity.227 Second, the restriction applied 
prospectively.228 If the employer took up an entirely new line of business, the 
employee would presumably be unable to work in that industry as well.229 
The court criticized the agreement, which focused not on employment that 
increased the risk of unfair competition, but instead on whether the new 
employer was similar to the old.230 “That is not a sufficient limiting factor for 
a covenant not to compete.”231 
The employer urged the court “to take up North Carolina’s ‘blue-
pencil’ doctrine and strike the offending language.”232 But the Fourth Circuit 
refused to do so, noting the limited reach of North Carolina’s blue pencil 
doctrine.233 “Under this doctrine, a court ‘may choose not to enforce a 
distinctly separable part of a covenant in order to render the provision 
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reasonable.’”234 But North Carolina’s blue-pencil rule “severely limits what 
the court may do to alter” an overly broad covenant not to compete.235 
Illinois 
In Illinois, at least one state appellate court refused to modify an 
unreasonable restriction.236 After examining the overly broad restrictions, the 
court found that it could not modify the agreement as the problems were “too 
great to permit modification.”237 The court’s refusal to modify the agreement 
was especially noteworthy in that the agreement contained a clause expressly 
permitting judicial modification.238 The court explained that “[i]n 
determining whether modification is appropriate, the fairness of the restraints 
contained in the contract is a key consideration.”239 
Wisconsin  
Wisconsin courts, too, have disfavored the blue pencil. In 2018, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to reform a nonsolicitation agreement. In 
Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, the court found that section 103.465 of the 
Wisconsin Code, which governs covenants not to compete, extends to 
agreements not to solicit employees.240 Because the nonsolicitation 
agreement at issue did not meet the standards for a valid noncompetition 
agreement, the Court found the entire agreement unenforceable, “even as to 
any part of the covenant that would be a reasonable restraint.”241 
While Wisconsin will enforce noncompetition agreements, it does so 
only in limited circumstances. Section 103.465 provides that “[a] covenant 
. . . not to compete . . . is lawful and enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or 
principal.”242 The statute further states that “[a]ny covenant, described in this 
section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and unenforceable 
even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable 
restraint.”243 
In Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. v. Schalk, a Wisconsin court 
denied Kohl’s request for an injunction preventing its Chief Information 
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Officer, Janet Schalk, from joining a competitor.244 The court refused in part 
because Schalk’s noncompetition agreement was overly restrictive when 
considered in light of Schalk’s role and in comparison with the 
noncompetition agreements of other employees.245 The court refused to 
enforce the noncompetition agreement or alter it to make it reasonable, noting 
that the agreement was more restrictive than those noncompetition 
agreements of senior managers. For instance, her agreement was more 
restrictive than that of other senior management personnel, whom the court 
found to have more access to confidential and sensitive information than 
Schalk did.246 The court noted that Kohl’s failed to demonstrate why Schalk 
should be treated differently than other executives.247 
Pennsylvania 
Nor are these the only cases in which courts have cast a wary eye at 
the blue-pencil doctrine. In Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied Pennsylvania law to modify 
an unreasonably broad agreement.248 The court stated that where “restrictions 
are so ‘gratuitous[ly]’ overbroad that they ‘indicate[] an intent to oppress the 
employee and/or to foster a monopoly,’ a court of equity may refuse to 
enforce the covenant at all.”249 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that 
“absent bad faith, Pennsylvania courts do attempt to blue-pencil covenants 
before refusing enforcement altogether.”250 
Texas 
Even in Texas, which has traditionally been a liberal blue pencil 
state, courts have been reluctant to reform overbroad agreements. In Sentinel 
Integrity Solutions, Inc. v. Mistras Group, Inc., the court noted that the 
employer had attempted to enforce what it knew to be an unreasonable non-
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compete agreement.251 The court refused the appellant’s request for 
reformation.252 
IV.   SOME STATE LEGISLATURES MANDATE THE USE OF THE BLUE 
PENCIL 
In an effort to create a business-friendly environment, some state 
legislatures have begun to mandate the use of the blue pencil doctrine.  
Nevada 
Nevada is interesting, as the state statute mandating blue penciling 
arose as a legislative response to the Golden Road decision.253 Rather than 
respecting the well-reasoned opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court, the 
Nevada legislature rejected the court’s refusal to alter the overbroad 
noncompetition agreement.254 To overturn the Nevada Supreme Court’s 
decision, the legislature opted to revise the state’s previous statute addressing 
noncompetition agreements, which at the time did not include any language 
regarding the judicial modification of unreasonable noncompetition 
agreements.255  
The new statute did two things. First, it provided a new analysis to 
determine which noncompetition agreements in Nevada are valid and 
enforceable. The new law requires that agreements be evaluated using a 
standard different than that set forth in prior court decisions or by previous 
versions of the statute. The revised statute states that restrictive covenants are 
unenforceable unless the employer establishes that the agreement: 
(a) is supported by valuable consideration; (b) does not 
impose any restraint that is greater than is required for the 
protection of the employer for whose benefit the restraint is 
imposed; (c) does not impose any undue hardship on the 
employee; and (d) imposes restrictions that are appropriate 
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in relation to the valuable consideration supporting the 
noncompetition covenant.256  
The statute also contains a legislative mandate requiring courts to use 
the blue pencil:  
If an employer brings an action to enforce a noncompetition 
covenant and the court finds the covenant is supported by 
valuable consideration but contains limitations as to time, 
geographical area or scope of activity to be restrained that 
are not reasonable, impose a greater restraint than is 
necessary for the protection of the employer for whose 
benefit the restraint is imposed and impose undue hardship 
on the employee, the court shall revise the covenant to the 
extent necessary and enforce the covenant as revised.257  
The statute provides, “Such revisions must cause the limitations 
contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area and scope of activity 
to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a restraint that is not greater 
than is necessary for the protection of the employer for whose benefit the 
restraint is imposed.”258  
This provision expressly rejected the Nevada Supreme Court’s 
Golden Road decision.259 Interestingly, the Nevada legislature’s action went 
well beyond what the dissent in Golden Road called for.260 In Golden Road, 
the dissenting justices argued that modification should only occur in limited 
circumstances.261  But this new law robs courts of their discretion to not 
modify an agreement.262 And because the court has no ability to refuse to 
modify the agreement, employers face little chance of sanction for requiring 
the employee to sign an unreasonable agreement. Rather, because courts may 
not make an inquiry into the motives of the employers, the new statute 
incentivizes an employer to overreach in the making of noncompetition 
agreements.263 
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Arkansas 
Arkansas has also required courts to pick up their blue pencils and 
modify unreasonable agreements. Prior to 2015, Arkansas courts viewed 
noncompetition agreements with disfavor.264 State courts would not enforce 
any part of a noncompetition agreement that they had determined was 
unreasonable in length of term or geographic scope.265 Courts in Arkansas 
followed the strict compliance rule: If the non-compete agreement was 
unreasonable with respect to a particular restrictive covenant, then a court 
would not enforce any part of the agreement.266 Moreover, if a court found 
the agreement to be unreasonable, and thus unenforceable, the employer 
seeking to enforce the agreement could be required to pay for the breaching 
employee’s attorney’s fees.267 
In 2015, that approach changed. The Arkansas legislature expanded 
the enforceability of noncompetition agreements in Arkansas.268 The state 
gave employers the ability to restrict competition after the termination of the 
employment relationship, even if a court found the terms of a non-compete 
agreement to be unreasonable.269 The new law allows courts to enforce the 
reasonable parts of a non-competition agreement, while requiring courts to 
amend the over-broad, unenforceable provisions.270 A court may no longer 
strike down the entire agreement.271 
Arkansas courts are now required to “blue-pencil” and rewrite what 
is otherwise found to be unreasonable without striking down the entire 
agreement.272 The statute states, “If restrictions in a covenant not to compete 
agreement are found to be unreasonable and impose a greater restraint than 
is necessary to protect the protectable business interest of the employer under 
subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the court shall reform the covenant not to 
compete agreement . . . .”273 The new law orders the court to reform the 
agreement “to the extent necessary to: (A) Cause the limitations contained in 
the covenant not to compete agreement to be reasonable; and (B) Impose a 
restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the protectable business 
interest.”274 
In essence, even if a court determines that the terms of an employer’s 
noncompetition agreement are unreasonable, the employer does not lose the 
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right to enforce the agreement.275 Instead, it can enforce the agreement to the 
extent of the court’s reformation.276 There are seemingly no negative 
consequences to the employer’s overreach. 
The Arkansas statute further expanded the ability of employers to 
restrict the mobility of their employees. First, the statute provides that 
continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for the employee 
to enter into the noncompetition agreement.277 The statute says nothing about 
how long the continuation of employment must be—it seems likely that only 
another day of employment is required to constitute consideration. 
Moreover, the Arkansas statute limits the need for a geographical 
restriction. If the noncompetition agreement does not contain a specific or 
defined geographic restriction, the absence of such provisions does not make 
the agreement overly broad, so long as the agreement is limited with respect 
to time and scope in a manner that is no greater than necessary to defend the 
protectable business interest of the employer.278 
The statute also provides for a lengthy time restriction, stating that a 
two-year period of restraint is presumptively reasonable.279 Unless the 
employee can establish that the particular facts and circumstances establish 
unreasonableness, the employee will remain bound.280 
Finally, the new statute provides employers with easier enforcement 
of the law. The law states that, “a court may award the employer damages for 
a breach of a covenant not to compete agreement, appropriate injunctive 
relief, or both, if appropriate.”281 Additionally, the statute presumes that, to 
obtain injunctive relief, “The immediate harm associated with the breach of 
a covenant not to compete agreement shall be considered irreparable.”282 
Idaho  
Idaho, too, has created rules requiring courts to blue pencil 
unreasonable agreements. Historically, Idaho courts hesitated to modify 
unreasonable agreements so as to make them reasonable. Instead, courts 
often simply chose to not enforce those unreasonable agreements, in whole 
or in part.283 The state legislature, however, altered this approach. Idaho law 
now states that, in the event that a noncompetition agreement contains 
unreasonable restrictions, “a court shall limit or modify the agreement or 
covenant as it shall determine necessary to reflect the intent of the parties and 
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render it reasonable in light of the circumstances in which it was made and 
specifically enforce the agreement or covenant as limited or modified.”284 
Texas 
Texas has also implemented rules designed to make it easier for 
employers to impose noncompetition agreements on employees. The law 
requires that courts modify unreasonable agreements so as to make them 
reasonable and enforceable.285 The Texas statute provides that if a court 
determines that the restrictions in an agreement “are not reasonable and 
impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other 
business interest of the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the 
extent necessary to cause the limitations . . . to be reasonable and to impose 
a restraint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or 
other business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as 
reformed . . . .”286 
Georgia 
The Georgia legislature has also recently instituted laws regarding 
judicial modification of unreasonable noncompetition agreements.287 The 
new law overturned precedent that prevented courts from modifying 
unreasonable agreements.288 The statute now expressly permits the 
practice.289 The statute does not, however, mandate the use of the blue pencil. 
Presumably, this omission was deliberate. Years ago, the Georgia legislature 
attempted to mandate the use of the blue pencil doctrine and require courts 
to reform unreasonable agreements.290 The Georgia Supreme Court objected, 
however, to the legislative attempt to undermine the court’s role in 
determining the enforceability of unreasonable agreements and found the 
statute unconstitutional.291 In 2009, the Georgia court reiterated its stance, 
writing, “[T]his Court has rejected a legislative attempt to usurp the 
application of standards of reasonableness to noncompetition covenants in 
employment agreements.”292  
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V.   AN ARGUMENT FOR RESTRICTING THE BLUE PENCIL 
The widespread use of the blue pencil, by both courts and state 
legislatures, should be restricted. Three arguments support this conclusion. 
A. The Blue Pencil Harms Employees 
A legislative mandate to amend unreasonable noncompetition 
agreements encourages employers to draft broad agreements, secure in the 
knowledge that mistakes in drafting not only can be corrected but must be 
corrected by a court. The blue pencil doctrine permits employers to 
overreach, and in so doing, harms employees.293 Employers may enter into 
unreasonable agreements, whether intentionally (or negligently), secure in 
the knowledge that bad faith (or lack of care) will be excused by a court. The 
employer can take advantage of a free ride on a contractual provision that the 
employer knew (or should have known) would never be enforced. In the 
words of one commentator, “[t]his smacks of having one’s employee’s cake, 
and eating it too.”294 
Perhaps the Georgia court in Rita Personnel Services International, 
Inc. v. Kot295 said it best:  
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are 
thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees 
who respect their contractual obligations and on competitors 
who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor, 
or who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with 
their competitors. Thus, the mobility of untold numbers of 
employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions 
whose severity no court would sanction.296 
Blue-penciling of the employment agreement creates an “in terrorem 
effect on an employee, who must try to interpret the ambiguous provision to 
decide whether it is prudent, from a standpoint of possible legal liability, to 
accept a particular job or whether it might be necessary to resist plaintiff’s 
efforts to assert that the provision covers a particular job.”297 The in terrorem 
effect of an overbroad agreement unduly restricts an employee’s ability to 
change jobs.298 
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In a time of near-full employment, employers must compete for the 
best employees.299 In a free market, employees would be able to sell their 
services to the employer that provided the highest wages and the best 
benefits.300 By legislatively mandating the blue pencil, however, states have 
placed a heavy thumb on the scale—to the disadvantage of employees. 
Enforcement of a barely-reasonable noncompetition agreement threatens the 
livelihoods of employees who had little say in the original language of the 
agreement.301  
Many courts have described the harmful effects of an overly broad 
restrictive covenant. In Reddy v. Community Health Foundation, the West 
Virginia Supreme Court criticized employers who used overly broad 
provisions, “where savage covenants are included in employment contracts 
so that their overbreadth operates, by in terrorem effect, to subjugate 
employees unaware of the tentative nature of such a covenant.”302 
Courts have traditionally viewed restraints on competition with 
suspicion.303 The disparity in bargaining power between the employer and 
the employee is great. The parties are in very unequal bargaining positions. 
At the moment an employee contracts with his employer, the employee is 
aware that he must agree to almost any provision regarding the restriction of 
mobility, even an unreasonable one.304 “Under a blue pencil doctrine, ‘the 
employer then receives what amounts to a free ride on’ the provision, perhaps 
knowing full well that it would never be enforced.”305  
It seems inevitable that use of the blue pencil doctrine, whether a 
result of judicial discretion or statutorily mandated, will increase the 
prevalence of overly broad clauses. Employers may overreach, whether 
negligently or on purpose. The Rita Personnel Services Court properly noted 
the negative consequences of the blue pencil doctrine.306 The Court explained 
that “[i]f severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly ominous 
covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when 
the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable.”307 In Valley Medical 
Specialists v. Farber, the Arizona Supreme Court criticized the use of the 
blue pencil doctrine, noting that “employers may therefore create ominous 
covenants, knowing that if the words are challenged, courts will modify the 
agreement to make it enforceable.”308 
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B. The Blue Pencil Creates Confusion 
Even in the absence of a legislative mandate, the blue pencil doctrine 
confuses employees, employers, and the court system. The doctrine prevents 
all parties—employees, employers, and courts—from predicting the proper 
construction of a noncompetition agreement.  
The blue pencil doctrine builds a level of uncertainty into every 
employment relationship.309 In those states that require the use of the blue 
pencil doctrine, an employee seeking greater opportunity will never be 
certain of her rights and will not know the actual terms of her noncompetition 
agreement.310 This uncertainty carries a cost: “the employee who remains at 
his position, fearful that the blue pencil would not help his case, suffers lost 
opportunity costs. The employee who leaves his position may be forced to 
accept a reduced salary from a new employer due to the perceived risk of 
litigation.”311 In Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc.,312 the court captures 
the heart of the problem: “The restless or departing employee could have no 
‘clear understanding of what conduct is prohibited.’ He could not secure 
meaningful legal advice because he could not know what the employer might 
want to enforce. He could not ask the employer to decide without effectively 
burning bridges with the employer.”313 
The blue pencil doctrine also burdens employers. The doctrine 
deprives employers of access to well-trained employees.314 A company that 
hires an employee nominally bound by a noncompetition agreement with a 
former employer may face potential liability for, among other things, tortious 
interference with contract.315 An employer seeking to hire a new employee 
must weigh the possible benefits of the hire against the possible burden of a 
lawsuit for tortious interference with contract by the previous employer.316 
Moreover, the blue pencil doctrine prevents an employer from ever knowing 
to what extent the previous noncompetition agreement will be enforced.317 
The noncompetition agreement is a double-edged sword in the context of 
employment: every employer that successfully restricts an employee from 
leaving deprives another employer from that employee’s efforts.  
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Finally, a legislatively-mandated blue pencil doctrine creates 
confusion for the judicial system. Courts that in the past have been called 
upon to decide questions of reasonableness must now also be charged with 
the responsibility of then drafting substitute noncompetition agreements.318  
C. The Blue Pencil Represents Bad Public Policy 
The compelled use of the blue pencil doctrine is bad public policy. 
The blue pencil doctrine creates an agreement containing terms that the 
parties did not agree to.319 The power to create a contractual obligation other 
than what the parties agreed to should rest only with the parties.320 A court 
has the responsibility of interpreting contracts and not writing them.321 
“[S]etting a precedent that establishes the judiciary’s willingness to partake 
in drafting would simply be inappropriate public policy as it conflicts with 
the impartiality that is required of the bench, irrespective of some 
jurisdictions’ willingness to overreach.”322 Delegating the drafting of 
employment agreements “blurs the line between the bench and the bar.”323 
Courts lack the power to create such agreements.324 
Furthermore, use of the blue pencil represents a poor use of judicial 
resources.  It is hard to imagine a greater waste of judicial time and energy 
than the need to re-draft a contract that has already been negotiated and 
executed. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, there are numerous reasons to reject or at least restrict 
the use of the blue pencil doctrine. Because it acts as a restraint of trade, 
courts and legislatures have traditionally remained suspicious of the 
noncompetition agreement. Common law has provided a deep body of law 
that sets out the circumstances under which a court should refuse to enforce 
a noncompetition agreement. No court will enforce an unreasonable 
agreement. 
As such, courts should limit use of the blue pencil doctrine. Courts 
should modify agreements only in extraordinary situations. The blue pencil 
doctrine should only protect those employers who can establish their good 
faith and provide an excuse for the unreasonable agreement.  
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Ultimately, the blue pencil doctrine, under the guise of equitable 
modification, harms employees, the court system, and society as a whole. 
Widespread use of the doctrine by courts is not warranted. Even worse is the 
belief that legislatures should impose their mandated use of the doctrine onto 
the court system. 
